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Abstract: Measuring security is a core step for guaranteeing security of network and
information systems. Due to massiveness and heterogeneity of measurement data, it is
difficult to classify and combine them on demand. In this paper, considering implication
relationship of metrics, we propose a combination model and combination policy for
security measurement. Several examples demonstrate the effectiveness of our model.
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1 Introduction
Security measurement for network and information systems [Yu et al., 2018],
used to evaluate the ability of protecting security in the real operating environ-
ment and involving security technology, management, manipulation and other
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aspects, is a significant step to ensure system security. Obviously, ignoring secu-
rity measurement will suffer from severe consequences. According to Kaspersky
Lab, in 2017 1, attackers used a vulnerability in the Apache Struts 2 framework
and stole the data of 145.5 million people and compromised more than 209,000
credit card numbers, including clients names, social security numbers, dates of
birth, and addresses.
According to BBC news 2, Ukraine has suffered two hacks on its power grid,
one in 2015 and the other in 2016. The first affected 225,000 and the second
knocked out about one-fifth of Kiev’s power consumption.
One of key reasons for the above events is lack of accurate measurement for
information systems. Due to this lack, the elements that effect information secu-
rity can not be correctly recognized and the interior states cannot be effectively
analyzed. Thus, it is impossible for us to prevent attacks or decrease attack
possibility. In fact, security is impossible without security measure.
To accurately measure security, we should classify and combine measure-
ment data on demand for the following reasons: security metrics for a sys-
tem rely on its security requirements and data with different categories should
be taken as evaluation input to evaluate each metric. For example, in the
military application, confidentiality is more cared about, thus data related
to information leakage should be taken as an evaluation input; In the life-
critical scene, availability and integrity are more cared about, thus data re-
lated to resource consumption and pollution might be required; In cloud scenar-
ios [Yu et al., 2017, Li et al., 2019, Xue et al., 2019], availability and privacy are
preferred. In practise, even for the same security metric, data category used for
evaluation is different. For example, for the confidentiality measure, data used in
military scene are different from the person scene. However, it is difficult to clas-
sify and combine data on demand due to data massiveness and heterogeneity3
and several challenges exist, as follows.
(1) Data division for security measure. Generally, one type of data can be de-
scribed by several dimensions. For example, in the real-world web image database
from National University of Singapore, an image is labeled using 1,134 dimension
feature vector including 500-D bag of words 4. The tags2con dataset, manually
created by a group of human annotators owns 500 user-bookmarks pairs. Obvi-
ously, it is very difficult to directly use these dimensions to measure security. It
1 https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/data-leaks-2017/19723/
2 https : //www.bbc.com/news/topics/cp3mvpdp1r2t/cyber−attack&link location =
live− reporting − story
3 According to Forbes, data created by human society will hit 163 Zettabytes
in 2025. These data, which come from a large number of managemen-
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is a huge challenge for us to dividing data from the aspect of security measure.
(2) Combination policy. Because data from a large number of sources are
often heterogeneous and massive and they can’t be directly used for measuring
security. Due to variation of security metrics, it is different for us to design one
policy to combine heterogeneous data.
To address the above challenges, in this paper, we propose a combination
model of heterogeneous data for security measurement. Our main contributions
are as follows.
(1) Considering implication relationship of metrics, we design hierarchical
metrics graph (HMG), including three layers: property layer, event layer and
data-collection-item layer. Based on the HMG, we present a fine-grained division
scheme to classify evaluation data for security measure.
(2) Based on HMG, a series of combination policies for measuring security
are proposed, including time-based priority, majority-based priority and low-risk
priority policies. Several examples demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
related work. In section 3, we propose our model to combine heterogeneous data.
We draw a conclusion in section 4.
2 Related work
Through data combination, data from multiple sources are integrated to
produce more consistent and trust information than that provided by
an individual source. Roughly, data combination, widely used for multi-
sensor [Khaleghi et al., 2013], privacy [Komarova et al., 2018], and disaster
detection[Ghosh, 2017], can be divided into three categories [Zheng, 2015,
Khaleghi et al., 2013]: the data-level-based combination, the feature level-based
data combination, and the decision-based data combination.
In the first approach, algorithms for data combination, taking raw data gath-
ered from different data sources as input and producing more reliable and ac-
curate data, can be divided into two categories: concatenation-based combina-
tion and fusion-based combination. In the concatenation-based scheme, multiple
datasets are loosely and simple coupled, without considering their consisten-
cy, correlation and disparateness. For example, combining the POIs (points of
interest) from several regions, we can obtain all POIs of a city.
In the fusion-based combination, when data are combined, data inconsis-
tency, data correlation, data imperfection and disparateness should be tackled.
Along with this scheme, Angelov et al. [Angelov and Yager, 2013] proposed a
new data fusion operator based on averaging to cluster and classify data. Dong
et al. [Dong et al., 2014] designed a self-adaption scheme with weighted aver-
age to combine multiple data with different precision and enhance combina-
tion precision. Graham et al. [Graham et al., 2016] proposed a local estimator
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to possess a double robustness property and classify semiparametric data. To
combination privacy data, based on infrequent observations, Komarova et al.
[Komarova et al., 2018] proposed a series of data combination rules and accu-
rately formalized combination conditions. Considering the identification of coun-
terfactual distributions, Fan et al.[Fan et al., 2014] adopted both the conditional
independence assumption and the common support assumption, and proposed
treatment effects under data combination.
In the feature-level-based combination, multiple features, treated equally or
unequally, are combined into feature vectors. In the equivalence scheme, sev-
eral features are concatenated sequentially [Wang et al., 2014]. However, this
approach can cause the over-fitting, redundancy and dependency problem-
s [Zheng, 2015]. To address these problems, machine learning (e.g., convolu-
tional neural networks [Chen et al., 2016, Romero et al., 2016], recurrent neural
network [Du et al., 2015], deep autoencoder [Xing et al., 2016] and deep belief
network[Jang et al., 2017]) are proposed to extract and fuse features.
Using a convolutional neural network, Chen et al. [Chen et al., 2016] pro-
posed a regularized feature extraction scheme to accurately classify hyperspec-
tral image. Romero [Romero et al., 2016] designed single-layer and deep convo-
lutional networks to remotely analyze sensing data and used greedy layerwise
unsupervised pertaining to learn sparse features. Shao et al.[Shao et al., 2017]
developed an enhancement scheme of deep feature fusion to rotate machinery
fault diagnosis. Charte et al. [Charte et al., 2018] surveyed autoencoders for non-
linear feature fusion from the aspect of taxonomy, models, software and guide-
lines. Considering recurrent neural network, Du et al. [Du et al., 2015] proposed
an end-to-end hierarchical RNN for skeleton based action recognition. Cascad-
ing 3-dimensional CNNN, Nguyen et al. [Nguyen et al., 2018] introduced deep
spatio-temporal features to recognize multimodal emotion.
In the decision combination, depending on specific fusion criterion, serval
sub-decisions from several individuals are combined into the optimal decision
[Hall and Llinas, 1997]. Roughly, decision fusion can be divided into three cate-
gories: Bayesian inference[Chen and Varshney, 2002], Dempster-Shafer evidence
theory [Kuncheva et al., 2001] and fuzzy theory[Fatemipour et al., 2014].
Using Bayesian inference, Chen et al.[Chen and Varshney, 2002] reformulat-
ed decision fusion problem as hierarchical models and proposed a Gibbs sampler
to perform posterior probability-based fusion. However, this approach cannot
distinguish between uncertain and unknown information. To address this prob-
lem, Fontani et al. [Fontani et al., 2013] and Zhang et al. [Zhang and Ge, 2015]
used Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to combine decision for image foren-
sics and for fault detection, respectively. Using fuzzy theory, Ribeiro et al.
[Ribeiro et al., 2014] designed a fusion algorithm based on multi-criteria deci-
sion making.
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Although a large number of efforts are spent on data combination, no one
combines data from security measure. In this paper, we propose a combination
model of heterogeneous data for security measure.
3 Combination Model for Heterogeneous Data
3.1 Classifying Heterogeneous Data Using Hierarchical Metrics
Graph
In this subsection, we define hierarchical metrics graph and then use it to classify
heterogeneous data for security measure. To achieve this goal, we first give the
definitions used in sequel.
Definition 1 (Metrics Graph, MG). Metrics graph MG = (V,E) be a weight-
ed and directed acyclic graph, where V = {v1, . . . , vn}, a set of vertex, denotes
all metrics for security evaluation; Vertex can be divided three layers: property
layer, event layer and data-collection-item layer. A property layer is composed
of property nodes, which denote the security properties that network and infor-
mation systems should satisfy. An event layer consists of a set of event nodes.
If the event in an event node happens, then the corresponding property for this
node will be compromised. Nodes in the data-collection-itme layer are used to
label the required collection data for detecting the event which connects this n-
ode. For example, to violently crack password, an attack has to continuously and
repeatedly guess the used password. If the login password for the same account
continuously and repeatedly fails, then event violent cracking might happen. In
this case, data item of incorrect password should be collected to detect the violent
cracking event.
E ⊆ V × V , a set of edges between nodes, denotes the hierarchy relationship
between metrics. Assume that e = (v1, v2) is an edge of graph MG, we have the
following constrains.
– if both v1 and v2 are property nodes, then property v2 is a sub property of
v1;
– if v1 and v2 are a property node and an event node, respectively, then the
property denoted by v1 will be violated when event denoted by v2 happens.
– if both v1 and v2 are event nodes, then one of the pre-conditions of event v1
is the occurrence of event v2.
– if v1 and v2 are an event node and an data-collection-item node, respectively,
then the data denoted by v2 should be collected for detecting the event denoted
by v1.
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Generally, security properties can be divided into two categories: basic prop-
erties and extended properties. According to definition of information security
proposed by Fang 5, there are four basic properties : confidentiality, authentica-
tion, availability and controllability. Both events can bring a positive or negative
impact on security properties. For example, encryption has a positive impact on
confidentiality and weak password has a negative impact on confidentiality. To
distinguish the two impacts, symbols + and - are used to denote the positive
and negative impacts on security property.
Definition 2 (Hierarchical Metrics Graph, HMG): Given metrics graph MG
with weight W ( i.e., HMG = (V,E,W )), HMG is a hierarchical metrics graph,
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) In graph MG, there exists only one node with the zero in-degee . This
node is called the root node of HMG;
(2) Given two edges e1 = (v11, v12) and e2 = (v21, v22) of graph MG, if
v12 = v21, then (v11, v22) is not in edge set E (i.e., (v11, v22) 6∈ E);
(3) Given property node v, the set of its sub property-nodes {v1, v2, · · · , vn}
and the set of the corresponding out-edges {e1, e2, · · · , en}
6 , weight wi(0 ≤
wi ≤ 1) is assigned to edge ei with constrains w1 + · · · + wn = 1. This weight
denotes the importance of property vi to property v.
Given edge e = (v1, v2) of HMG, the hierarchy of its starting node (i.e., v1,)
is always higher than that of its ending node (i.e., v2).
According to Fang 7, we can give the HMG for security measurement, as
shown in Fig 1. According to this definition, four basic properties (i.e., confiden-
tiality, availability, controllability and authentication) can be used to measure
security, where reliability, stability and survivability are sub-properties of avail-
ability. In Fig. 1, weights ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 denote the importance of availability,
confidentiality, controllability and authentication to security measurement in a
specific scene. For example, in a scene, if availability, confidentiality and authen-
tication are equally important, and controllability can be ignored, then we can
set ω1 = ω2 = ω4 =
1
3 and ω3 = 0.
According to HMG and requirement for measuring security of the specific
scene, we can divide heterogeneous data into several categories. For example,
if we only consider the availability, then data, used to label leaf nodes whose
ancestor is availability, can be regarded as one category; the other data can be
ignored because these data do not be used to measure availability. Algorithm 1
shows how to classify data using HMG.
5 https://wenku.baidu.com/view/00b08709bb68a98271fefa55.html
6 That is, e1 = (v, v1), . . . , en = (v, vn)
7 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog 7110463b0100ynty.html
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Figure 1: Example: Hierarchical Metrics Graph
3.2 Combining heterogeneous data
After classifying data, we should consistently combine these data. Generally, the
combination schemes can be roughly divided into two categories: physical com-
bination and logical combination. Physical combination denotes that more than
one piece of data are piled up, including: the file-level combination, the tuple-
level combination, the database-level combination, the table-level combination,
the row-level combination and the column-level combination. In logical combi-
nations, more than one piece of data are fused into one organic whole. However,
during the data combination, the following challenges exist.
Data consistence: Data, used to measure security, come from a large num-
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Algorithm 1: Classify data using HMG
Input: Security goal; data to be classified; HMG
Output: Classification of the queried data
1 Querys the queried security goal from HMG and returns the corresponding node ;
2 Takes the returned node as the root node and starts to traverse the sub-HMG (note: the
returned is the root of the sub-HMG) ;
3 while Traversing sub-HMG is NOT completed do
4 if Data to be queried match a leaf node then
5 Adds the label of the node to the queried data ;
6 end
7 end
ber of data sources and are inconsistent. For the same leaf metric shown in Fig.
1, its values from the different data sources might vary. For example, in coop-
erative intrusion detections, to detect whether an intrusion even happens in a
system, multiple nodes cooperatively monitor the detected system and report
their monitor results. However, the capabilities of nodes vary. This will cause
inconsistent results. To accurately detect an intrusion event, it is necessary to
consistently combine data from different data sources.
Data heterogeneity: Data (e.g., log information, and device information)
collected by collection agent are often semi-structured and even heterogeneous.
Obviously, a measurement system cannot take heterogeneous data as input.
Thus, we should converse semi-structured or heterogeneous data to structured
data.
3.2.1 Consistence guaranteeing
In this subsection, we discuss composition policies that can be used to guarantee
data consistence.
Policy 1 (Time priority): If more than one piece of data are labelled to one leaf
node in HMG, then the latest piece of data is selected as the final result.
Example 1 Assume that there are two firewall logs as shown in Fig. 2, the first
log and the second log happen at Aug 24 2017 08:54:48 and Jan 13 2014 13:46:36,
respectively. After the two logs are combined, the combination result is the first
log and the second log can be ignored (because the second log is out of date).
Policy 2 (Majority priority): If more than one piece of data are labelled to one
leaf node in HMG and then the piece of data which are major is selected as the
final result.
Example 2 Assume that, in cooperative intrusion detections, four cooperators
believe that the host with IP 192.168.150.77 are suffering from the PHPKIT
remotely inject SQL script attack, and one cooperator believes that the host is
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Figure 2: Time-priority-based combination
suffering from the PYTHONKIT remotely inject SQL script attack. According
to the majority-priority policy, the final combination result is PHPKIT remotely
inject SQL script.
Policy 3 (Low risk priority): If more than one data sources should be combined
into one piece of data, the combination with the lowest risk is adopted.
Access control [Yu et al., 2018, Yu et al., 2017] is important to ensure data
security. Next, we give the declassification and endorsement in access control
models as an example to show the low-risk policy.
In access control, Bell-LaPadula model and Biba model [Matt, 2003] are of-
ten used to provide confidentiality and integrity, respectively. In the basic Bell-
LaPadula model, the confidentiality levels with partial order relationship(e.g.,
public≤ confidentiality≤ secret≤ top secret) are designed to label data and ac-
cessors. Only if the level of an accessor is greater than or equal to the level of
the accessed data, the accessor can read the data; Only if the level of an accessor
is less than or equal to the level of the accessed data, the accessor can write the
data.
In the basic Biba model, an integrity level with partial order relationship
(e.g., low integrity ≤ middle integrity ≤ high integrity) is used to label data and
accessors. Only if the integrity level of an accessor is greater than or equal to
the integrity level of the accessed data, the accessor can write the data; Only if
the integrity level of an accessor is less than or equal to the integrity level of the
accessed data, the accessor can read the data.
We use C = {public, confidentiality, secret, topsecret} to denote a set of
confidentiality levels and I = {lowintegrity,middleintegrity, highintegrity} to
denote a set of integrity levels. For simplicity, tuple (c, i) is used to denote a
security level, where c ∈ C and i ∈ I. Given two security levels (c1, i1) and
(c2, i2), formula (c1, i1) ≤ (c2, i2) holds, if both c1 ≤ c2 and i2 ≤ i1 hold. We use
risk(dx : (cx, ix), dy : (cy, iy), dz : (cz, cz)) to denote the risk when combining dx
with security level (cx, ix) and dy with security level (cy, iy) into dz with security
level (cz, iz). Next, we discuss combination between d1 with security level (c1, i1)
and d2 with security level (c2, i2) in different access scenes (the obtained data
through combination are d3 : (c3, i3)).
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Scene 1. Assume that (c1, i1) ≤ (c2, i2), the security level of all accessors
are higher than (c2, i2), and only operation of all accessors to data d3 is read. In
this scene, according to Bell-LaPadula model and Biba model, all accessors can
read d3 no matter whether the level of data d3 is (c1, i1) or (c2, i2). Because of
(c1, i1) ≤ (c2, i2), the risk brought by data d3 : (c2, i2) is less than by data d3 :
(c1, i1) (i.e., risk(d1 : (c1, i1), d2 : (c2, i2), d3 : (c1, c1)) ≤ risk(d1 : (c1, i1), d2 :
(c2, i2), d3 : (c2, c2))). According to Policy 3, the obtained data is d3 with security
level (c2, i2).
Scene 2. Assume that (c1, i1) ≤ (c2, i2), the security level of all accessors
equals (c1, i1), and only operation of all accessors to data d3 is read. In this scene,
all accessor can read d3 only if the level of data d3 is (c1, i1). If the security level
of d3 is labeled as (c1, i1), then the risk of data leakage might exit (because
the confidentiality level in d3 is c2 (c2 ≥ c1)). However, if security level of d3
is labeled as (c2, i2), then the availability risk might exit (because the accessors
with security level (c1, i1) can not read d3. According to Policy 3, if formula
risk(d1 : (c1, i1), d2 : (c2, i2), d3 : (c1, c1)) ≤ risk(d1 : (c1, i1), d2 : (c2, i2), d3 :
(c2, c2))) holds, then the security level of d3 is (c1, i1); otherwise, its level is
(c2, i2).
4 Conclusions
To provide security for network and information systems, it is necessary to
measure security. Due to massiveness and heterogeneity of data from different
sources, it is difficult to classify and combine data on demand. In this paper,
considering implication relationship of metrics, we propose a combination model
and combination policy for security measurement.
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